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INTRODUCTION

In trying to understand how the Roberts Court will address issues of sex
discrimination and equal protection, it would make sense to focus on the two new
Justices on the Court and how they might vote in upcoming sex discrimination
cases. After all, the difference between the stable Rehnquist Court of the 1990s and
early 2000s and the new Roberts Court is Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.
However, for this Article, I am going to assume that what we have seen so far from
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito-that in issues of antidiscrimination law
they will consistently vote with Justices Scalia and Thomas'-will remain true and
that their future votes will not be difficult to predict.
*Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University Earle Mack School of Law. I would like to thank
Stefanie Lindquist, Dana Irwin, and Emily Zimmerman for thoughtful comments while working on this
Article and Megan Feehan, Peter Egler, and Lindsey Hoban for valuable research assistance. Also,
thank you to the entire staff ofthe South CarolinaLaw Review for hosting a wonderful symposium and
working to make this a better piece.
1. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2745
(2007); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2165 (2007); Gonzales v. Carhart,
127 S. Ct. 1610, 1618 (2007); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2603 04
(2006). But see CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 76 U.S.L.W. 4322 (U.S. May 27, 2008) (reporting
that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined the majority in favor of a civil rights claim, with
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissenting); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 76 U.S.L.W. 4331 (U.S. May 27,2008)
(reporting that Justice Alito wrote the majority in favor of a civil rights claim, with Chief Justice
Roberts joining Justices Scalia and Thomas dissenting).
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Thus, rather than focusing on Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Al ito, the focus
should be on Justice Kennedy, the Justice whose vote will be the most important
in determining the Court's approach to sex discrimination. Justice Kennedy is now
believed to be the Court's median Justice': the Justice who sits in the ideological
center of the Court, so that half of the Justices are more conservative and half are
more liberal.3 The median Justice is not to be confused with a Justice who is
ideologically moderate, as the median Justice can be very conservative or liberal,
just not as conservative or liberal as the four other Justices to the ideological left or
right.4 In his role as the median Justice, Justice Kennedy has been enormously
successful at having his views adopted by the Court as a whole. Last Term, in his
first full Term as the new median Justice, Justice Kennedy dissented only twice and
sided with the majority in all twenty-four closely divided cases.' Because of his
new role and power on the Court, Justice Kennedy has been receiving increased
attention.6
Despite this increased attention to Justice Kennedy and his twenty years on the
Court,7 little scholarly attention has been paid to his views andjurisprudence on sex
discrimination. Scholars have focused on related issues, such as his overall
philosophy about equality,8 his moral roots, 9 and his views on employment

2. See Charles Whitebread, The Conservative Kennedy Court What a Difference a Single Justice
Can Make: The 2006-2007 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 29 WHITTIERL. REV.1, 3 (2007)
(noting 2006-2007 as the year of the "rise ofthe Kennedy Court"); Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy: The
Highly InfluentialMan in the Middle, WASH. POST, May 13, 2007, atAl (discussing Kennedy's new
role as the median Justice).
3. See generally Andrew D. Martin etal., The MedianJustice on the UnitedStates Supreme Court,
83 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005) (analyzing how to effectively identify a median justice).
4. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Myth of the Balanced Court,THE AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 13, 2007, at
28,availableathttp://prospect.org/cs/articles?article-the myth of the balanced court(discussingthe
ideological composition of the Roberts Court and explaining that today's median Justice is much more
conservative than median Justices in the past).
5. See Posting of Jason Harrow to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/
justice-kennedys-remarkable-ot06/ (June 28, 2007, 17:20 EST). The phrase "closely divided cases"
refers to those cases decided by a 5 to 4 or 5 to 3 vote.
6. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Clues to the New Dynamic on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES,
July 3, 2007, at AlIl (discussing Kennedy's role in two key decisions since he became the median
Justice); Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Leader: The Arrogance ofJustice Anthony Kennedy, NEW REPUBLIC,
June 18, 2007, at16; Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, The Power Broker, NEWSWEEK, July 16, 2007,
at 36 (detailing an exclusive interview with Justice Kennedy); Edward Lazarus, The CurrentSupreme
Court Term, and the Pivotal Role of "Swing" Justice Anthony Kennedy, FINDLAW, Dec. 6, 2007,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20071206.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2008) (discussing the media
attention Kennedy has received since becoming the Court's new median Justice).
7. Justice Kennedy has served on the Court for twenty years as of 2008, having taken his judicial
oath on February 18, 1988. Harvard Law School, Justice Kennedy Comes Back to HLS to Mark 20
Years on the Supreme Court (Mar. 12, 2008), http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2008/03/
12 kennedy.php (last visited Apr. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Justice Kennedy Comes Back].
8. See Akhil Reed Amar, Justice Kennedy and the Ideal of Equality, 28 PAC. L.J. 515 (1997)
(discussing the views of Justice Kennedy on equality and the role his views have played in a few key
opinions).
9. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Three Justices in Search of a Character: The Moral Agendas of
Justices O'Connor,Scalia and Kennedy, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 221-23 (1996) (explaining how the
conservative Justices use their moral beliefs in deciding cases).
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discrimination,' 1 race discrimination,'' children's rights, 2 and constitutional
interpretation. 13However, no scholarly literature has focused on his views regarding
sex and gender. This Article seeks to fill that void by analyzing Justice Kennedy's
sex discrimination jurisprudence and, based on that jurisprudence, drawing
conclusions about his thoughts on sex and gender.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I reviews the cases involving sex
discrimination14 in which Justice Kennedy has participated while on the Court and
how he has voted in those cases. In particular, because of Justice O'Connor's
previous role as the median Justice, 5 this Part compares Justice Kennedy's votes
to Justice O'Connor's for cases in which they both sat to predict how different the
Court's approach to sex discrimination will be with Justice Kennedy as the median
Justice. Part II analyzes Justice Kennedy's votes and opinions in sex discrimination
cases and attempts to summarize his views. Finally, Part III evaluates Justice
Kennedy's conceptions of gender in his opinions and votes. Ultimately, this Article
concludes that Justice Kennedy's new role as median Justice is troubling for sex
equality jurisprudence generally and constitutional sex discrimination cases
specifically, as Justice Kennedy has shown a tendency, in cases arising in the
parent child context, to adhere to traditional and paternalistic gender roles.
II.

JUSTICE KENNEDY'S SEX DISCRIMINATION VOTES

Justice Kennedy has received well-deserved praise for some key votes and
opinions during his tenure. His switch in Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern
Pennsylvaniav. Casey 6 rescuedRoe v. Wade1 from being overruled. 8 He was also
part of the majority that found the Virginia Military Institute's policy of sex
segregation unconstitutional. 9 Furthermore, he authored the majority opinions in

10. See Robin Olinger Bell, Comment, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy: Will HisAppointment to the
United States Supreme Court Have an Impact on Employment Discrimination?, 57 U. CINN. L. REV.
1037 (1989) (analyzing Justice Kennedy's appellate court decisions and how his appointment will
impact employment discrimination).
11. See Heather K. Gerken, Comment, Justice Kennedy andthe Domains ofEqual Protection,121
HARV. L. REV. 104, 105 (2007) (discussing Justice Kennedy's views on race and arguing that his views
differ from those of Justices O'Connor and Powell).
12. See Daniel Gordon, America's Constitutional Dad: Justice Kennedy and His Intricate
Children, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 161, 162 (2007) (discussing Justice Kennedy's role as a "constitutional
guardian of America's children").
13. See Lisa K. Parshall, Embracingthe Living Constitution:Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's Move
Away From a Conservative Methodology of ConstitutionalInterpretation,30 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 25,
28 (2007) (discussing Justice Kennedy's "approach to constitutional interpretation" that "appears to
have embraced the concept of a "'living Constitution"').
14. This Article uses the term sex discriminationvery broadly to include all issues touching on
sex and gender. For more of a description of how the Article uses the term, see infratext accompanying
notes 21 27.
15. See Martin et al., supra note 3, at 1300.
16. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. Tony Mauro, Lifting the Veil: JusticeBlackmun's Papersand the PublicPerception of the
Supreme Court, 70 Mo. L. REV. 1037, 1040 (2005) (citations omitted); Posting of JB to Balkinization,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2004/08/from-blackmun-papers-day-roe-v-wade.html (Aug. 21,2004, 18:21
EST).
19. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 518, 519 (1996).
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the two leading cases furthering the constitutional rights of gays and lesbians, under
principles of both equality and liberty.20 However, these high profile victories for
antidiscriminationjurisprudence mask Justice Kennedy's overwhelming pattern of
voting against parties raising sex discrimination claims.
Before setting forth the numbers that prove this tendency, I will first explain
the case-counting methodology I used to reach this conclusion. From the 1,900
cases that Justice Kennedy has participated in since he joined the Court in 1988,21
I collected all cases that addressed some element of sex discrimination. I was
broadly inclusive within this rubric. Obvious inclusions were cases addressing Title
IX,22 abortion, and the Violence Against Women Act,23 because these statutes and
topics directly affect women and raise issues of equality and discrimination.24 I
included all Title VII and equal protection cases involving claims of sex
discrimination,25 as well as gay rights cases because of the important relationship
between sexual orientation and gender construction.26 Finally, I included several
miscellaneous cases that peripherally considered sex and gender issues, such as
pregnancy, paternity, private club discrimination, and sex education. In total,
Justice Kennedy has participated in sixty-six cases that have touched on sex
discrimination issues as I have broadly defined them here.27 A complete list of the
categorized cases I studied appears in Appendix A.

20. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 578-79 (2003) (finding a Texas law banning samesex sodomy to be a violation of the Due Process Clause); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996)
(finding that the Colorado constitutional amendment denying government protection to gays and
lesbians violated the Equal Protection Clause).
21. DAVID G. SAVAGE, Kennedy, Anthony McLeod, in 2 GUIDETO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 1018,
1018 19 (4th ed. rev. 2004), available at http://library.cqpress.com/scc/gct4v2-227-9668-607236
(reporting 1,900 cases through the end of June 2007).
22. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000 & Supp. 111
2003).
23. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42
U.S.C.).
24. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical
Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 815 (2007) (explaining the
connection between reproductive rights cases and sex equality).
25. Certainly many Title VII race-discrimination claims would have an impact on Title VII sex
discrimination claims as well, but they were not included because they are outside the scope of this
Article. Race-based equal protection claims might also impact sex-based claims, but the impact of one
on the other is diminished when one considers that claims based on race and sex are analyzed under
different levels of scrutiny and have different constitutional histories. See David S. Cohen, Title IX.
Beyond Equal Protection,28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 217, 244 47 (2005) (comparing the constitutional
levels of scrutiny for race-based and sex-based claims).
26. See generally Nan D. Hunter, The Sex DiscriminationArgument in Gay Rights Cases, 9 J.L.
& POL'Y 397 (2001) (discussing recent Supreme Court cases involving sexual orientation within the
framework of sex discrimination); Andrew Koppelman, Why DiscriminationAgainst LesbiansandGay
Men isSex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994) (arguing that discrimination against
homosexuals is sex-based discrimination and that laws implicating such discrimination should receive
heightened scrutiny); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality andthe Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L.
REV. 187 (1988) (discussing the correlation between the perception of homosexuality and the meaning
of gender in society).
27. I used Westlaw's "Terms and Connectors" search function in the Supreme Court database to
find any cases in which Justice Kennedy has participated and in which the terms abortion,sex, gender,
gay, homosexual, pregnancy,or any of their variations appeared in the syllabus of the Court's opinion.
I then reviewed the cases for those in which the Court decided issues related to these concepts rather
than those in which the Court merely mentioned the word.
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Next, I classified each case as reaching a conclusion that is either for or against
the claim of sex discrimination. Two cases, Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of
Western New York 28 and Casey, were split decisions in which one group of Justices
ruled in favor of a portion of the sex discrimination claim 2' and another group of
Justices ruled against a different part of the claim.3" Most of the other cases had
outcomes that were easy to classify. I considered the decisionfor the claim of sex
discrimination if it struck down a restrictive abortion statute; interpreted the Equal
Protection Clause, Title IX, or Title VII broadly to encompass a particular type of
claimed discrimination or expand it procedurally; or ruled in favor of a party
claiming that a law infringed upon gay rights. I considered the decision againstthe
claim of sex discrimination if it did otherwise.
However, some cases were more difficult to classify. For instance, First
Amendment protections have been important to the advancement of civil rights
generally and women's rights in particular, 3 but I classified decisions ruling against
the First Amendment claim as ruling for the sex discrimination claim where the two
conflicted, such as in the abortion protest cases 32 and the various public
accommodations 33 cases. A complete list of these cases and how I categorized their
outcomes can also be found in Appendix A.
Finally, I determined Justice Kennedy's position in each case and whether he
wrote his own opinion or simply joined one written by another Justice. These
positions are also listed in Appendix A.
Analyzing Justice Kennedy's positions in these cases reveals a Justice who
generally does not side with claims of sex discrimination. Overall, he voted against
the sex discrimination claim 66% of the time (43.5 out of the 66 cases). Removing
the twenty-three unanimous cases from the analysis demonstrates even starker
results. In the nonunanimous cases, Justice Kennedy voted against the sex
discrimination claim 78% of the time (33.5 out of 43 cases). Looking at the cases
in which one Justice's switch would have changed the outcome shows that Justice
Kennedy has almost never sided with the sex discrimination claim in close cases.
In such cases, he voted against the sex discrimination claim 97.5% of the time (19.5
out of 20 cases). His one-half vote in favor of a sex discrimination claim in a
closely divided case was his vote in Casey to preserve the "essential holding" of
Roe v. Wade;3 4 however, even that came with his vote to uphold all but one of the
restrictive abortion provisions at issue in the case. 5 Thus, Justice Kennedy's high

28. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
29. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 361; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843-44
(1992).
30. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 385 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting inpart); Casey, 505 U.S.
at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
31. SAMUEL WALKER, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RIGHTS AND COMMUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA
95 100 (1998) (explaining the importance of free speech to women's and civil rights movements).
32. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707 (2000); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S.
753, 757 (1994); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476 (1988).
33. Boy Scouts ofAm. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 515 U.S.
557, 559 (1995); N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 4 (1988).
34. 505 U.S. at 845 46 ("After considering the fundamental constitutional questions resolved by
Roe, principles of institutional integrity, and the rule of stare decisis, we are led to conclude this: the
essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed.").
35. Id. at 879 901.
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profile votes in Romer, Lawrence, Casey, and United States v. Virginia are not
representative of a broad commitment to sex equality in the law; rather, these votes
are outliers in a relatively consistent body of jurisprudence voting against sex
discrimination claims.
The following chart shows this voting pattern and breaks the pattern down even
further by subject matter of the cases:

Overall
Nonunanimous
Closely Divided
Abortion
Equal Protection
Title IX
Title VII
Nonunanimous Title VII
Gay Rights
Miscellaneous

Total
66
43
20
21
7*
5
24
12
6*
4

For
22.5 (34%)
9.5 (22%)
0.5 (2.5%)
1.5 (7%)
3 (43%)
1 (20%)
14 (58%)

3 (25%)
2 (33%)
2 (50%)

Against
43.5 (66%)
33.5 (78%)
19.5 (97.5%)
18.5 (88%)
4 (57%)
4 (80%)
10 (42%)
9 (75%)
4 (67%)
2 (50%)

*For these numbers, I have included Romer v. Evans in both the Equal Protection category as well as the Gay Rights
category.

To further demonstrate the effect the new median Justice will have on the
Roberts Court, it is worth comparing Justice Kennedy's votes in these cases to those
of the last median Justice, Justice O'Connor. Justice O'Connor's time as median
Justice was characterized by a strong tendency to vote for sex discrimination
claims. 6 In comparison, Justice Kennedy's track record is quite different. Of the
sixty-six cases studied here, Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy sat together for
fifty-eight of them. 7 Eighteen of those cases were unanimous decisions, leaving
forty cases in which there was at least some disagreement among the Justices.
Justice O'Connor's and Justice Kennedy's votes in these forty cases can be broken
down as follows:
(1) Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy agreed on the position
against the sex discrimination claim 17 times (approximately
43% of the time).
(2) Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy agreed on the position
in favor of the sex discrimination claim 9.5 times
(approximately 24% of the time).

36. See Paul Bender & Chelsea Sage Durkin, Justice O'Connor's Race and Gender
Jurisprudence,39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 829, 830 31 (2007) (noting that Justice O'Connor voted in favor of
women's groups in seventy-five percent of the fifty sex-discrimination cases analyzed).
37. Six cases were decided after Justice O'Connor left the Supreme Court. See Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007); Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007);
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic &
Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47 (2006); Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9 (2006);
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006). There were two others in which she did not participate.
See Pollard v. E.l. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 844 (2001); Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 901 (1989).
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(3) Justice O'Connor voted in favor of the sex discrimination
claim 13.5 times when Justice Kennedy voted against it
(approximately 34% of the time).
(4) In no case did Justice Kennedy vote for the sex
discrimination claim when Justice O'Connor voted against it.
Stated differently, in their overlapping nonunanimous cases, Justice O'Connor
voted for the sex discrimination claim approximately 58% of the time (23 out of 40
cases) whereas Justice Kennedy voted for the sex discrimination claim only
approximately 24% of the time (9.5 out of 40 cases). Importantly, Justice Kennedy
never voted for a sex discrimination claim when Justice O'Connor voted against it.
A comparison of the two Justices' positions in the cases in which they sat together
appears in Appendix B.
111. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S SEX DISCRIMINATION DOCTRINE

The data in the previous Part shows that Justice Kennedy's voting record is not
one that is friendly to claims of sex discrimination. Especially when compared to
Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy is a much more conservative Justice with
respect to his views on sex discrimination. This Part looks at Justice Kennedy's
voting and opinions in the sixty-six sex discrimination cases in which he has
participated and attempts to set forth doctrinal themes from his sex discrimination
jurisprudence. The next Part then analyzes Justice Kennedy's overarching views on
gender.
I make the following observations fully aware of the difficulty of drawing
general principles from a limited number of cases. A small sample size always
presents a problem when performing such an analysis. Furthermore, trends and
patterns may be more of a reflection on the peculiarities and actual merits of cases
that reach the Court rather than an overall jurisprudential philosophy. Nonetheless,
I offer the following analysis as the best summary I can make of Justice Kennedy's
jurisprudence in this particular area over the past twenty years.
A.

Equal Protection

Justice Kennedy has a split record in the seven equal protection cases that have
raised sex discrimination-related claims. A chronological look at the cases may
partially explain the split. In Justice Kennedy's first three equal protection sex
discrimination-related cases, he sided with the claimant and against the
government. His most prominent equal protection case is Romer v. Evans, in which
he wrote that government action based on animus toward a particular group-in
Romer, gay men and lesbians-does not survive rational basis review.38 The
decision in Romer came in-between two other cases in which hejoined the majority
striking down sex-discriminatory state action: J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 9

38. 517 U.S.
reasons offered for
it affects; it lacks a
39. 511 U.S.

620, 632 (1996) ("[Amendment 2's] sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the
it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class
rational relationship to legitimate state interests.").
127 (1994).
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considering peremptory challenges used in a sex-discriminatory manner,4" and
United States v. Virginia,4 considering a challenge to Virginia's all male military
academy.42 All three cases were decided between 1994 and 1996. They are
important cases that expanded equal protection principles to women and gay men
and lesbians 43 in key areas of civic life.
However, in the cases decided after 1996, Justice Kennedy adopted a much
more restrictive equal protectionj urisprudence. He twice sided against finding that
Congress violated the Constitution in differentiating among foreign-born children
of United States citizens based on whether the citizen was a man (the father) or a
woman (the mother).44 In addition, he twice sided against broad interpretations of
Congress's power to implement the Equal Protection Clause under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.45
As discussed further in depth below, three of these latter cases involved issues
in which it is most clear that Justice Kennedy accepts gender
stereotypes government action that implicates parent-child relationships. Both of
the citizenship cases turned on how the Justices viewed the differences between the
relationships mothers and fathers have with their children at birth.46 Justice
Kennedy's conception of equal protection allows the government to treat mothers
and fathers differently, and therefore he sided with the majority upholding
Congress's differential treatment.47 Similarly, Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs was another Fourteenth Amendment case that also involved
government regulation of the family. The case specifically addressed Congress's
power under the Family and Medical Leave Act to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.48 In that case, Justice
Kennedy wrote an opinion dissenting from the Court's holding that Congress had
the authority under Section 5 to regulate state-created family leave policies.
According to Justice Kennedy, Congress did not have enough evidence of sex
discrimination to intrude upon this traditionally state regulated area.49
With only seven cases to draw upon, observations of patterns cannot be stated
with a great deal of certainty. However, it does appear that Justice Kennedy's early
equal protection cases, in which he found that women and gay men and lesbians
excluded from civic participation were entitled to constitutional protection, are
more friendly to sex discrimination claims than his opinions in the more recent

40. Id. at 129-30.
41. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
42. Id. at 519.
43. The Romer Court, however, did not apply heightened scrutiny to claims based on sexual
orientation.
44. Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 445 46 (1998)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
45. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 744 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
46. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 424; Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 56 57.
47. Miller, 523 U.S. at 424; Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 56-57.
48. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 724-25.
49. Id. at 746 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The evidence to substantiate this charge [that states have
discriminated in the past] must be far more specific, however, than a simple recitation of a general
history of employment discrimination against women.... Persisting overall effects of gender-based
discrimination at the workplace must not be ignored; but simply noting the problem is not a substitute
for evidence which identifies some real discrimination the family leave rules are designed to prevent.").
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equal protection cases, in which he accepted different treatment of mothers and
fathers and endorsed limiting Congress's power to restrict discrimination based on
sex.
B. Abortion
Justice Kennedy is hailed in some circles as the Justice who saved Roe v.
Wade. 0 In 1992, Planned Parenthood v. Casey offered the Court a clear
opportunity to overrule Roe. 5 Based on the votes of the individual Justices in cases
prior to Casey, the Third Circuit concluded that the strict scrutiny standard from
Roe was no longer binding because enough Justices had expressed doubts about
Roe in cases following the landmark decision to create a majority of Justices who
would apply a different, less-exacting standard. 2 However, Casey's famous joint
opinion preserved what it called the "essential holding" of Roe, despite the fact that
Casey did much of what the Third Circuit had predicted 3 : it jettisoned Roe's strict
scrutiny standard in favor of a more lenient "undue burden" test. 4 Justice Kennedy
was one of the authors of the joint opinion and thus one of the five Justices in Casey
who voted to preserve the "essential holding" of Roe. 5
What is sometimes overlooked in the praise for Kennedy's Roe-saving position
in Casey is the way he and the other Justices voted on the particular provisions of
Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act. Planned Parenthood challenged six separate
provisions, 6 and the Supreme Court upheld five of them.57 The Court struck down
the spousal notification provision, which required married women to notify their
spouses before obtaining an abortion, 8 but upheld Pennsylvania's "medical
emergency" definition, 9 stringent informed consent requirement, 60 twenty-four
hour waiting period, 61judicial bypass procedure, 62 and reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.63 Justice Kennedy showed great sympathy for women who were
victims of domestic violence in agreeing with four other Justices that the spousal
notification provision constituted an undue burden because women married to

50. See Mauro, supra note 18.
51. Posting of JB, supranote 18.
52. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 697 (3d Cir. 1991) ("In these
circumstances, we conclude that it would be inconsistent with the teachings of [the Supreme Court] for
lower courts to apply the strict scrutiny test
of Roe [] to all abortion regulations."), aff'd inpart,rev 'd
inpart,505 U.S. 833 (1992).
53. Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
54. Id. at 876.
55. Id.at 843.
56. Id.at844. The Court considered the informed consent provision and the twenty-four hour
waiting period in the same section of the opinion but nonetheless separately analyzed them.
57. Id. at 879 901.
58. Id.at 898.
59. Id.at 880.
60. Id. at 884 85.
61. Id. at 887.
62. Id.at 899. Judicial bypass is a procedure in which minor women who do not want to obtain
their parent's consent for an abortion can get a judge to approve of the procedure.
63. Id. at 901.
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abusive husbands might not want to inform them of their abortion decision.64
However, he failed to exhibit the same sympathy for poor and working-class
women who would be burdened by the waiting period requirement because of their
inability to make repeated appointments, or for minors required to get parental
consent or talk with a judge about a private medical procedure.65
Unfortunately for abortion rights and sex-equality jurisprudence, this less
heralded part of Casey is much more indicative of Justice Kennedy's abortion
jurisprudence. In fact, other than Pennsylvania's spousal notification requirement,
Justice Kennedy has not considered any other abortion restriction unconstitutional.
Under Justice Kennedy's views regarding abortion, restrictions on dilation and
67
extraction abortions, 66 all variations of parental notification and consent statutes,
restrictions on the performance of abortions to physicians only, 68 and viability
tests 69 are all constitutional. He has also joined with Court majorities that have
broadly interpreted severability jurisprudence to require piecemeal invalidation
of
7
abortion statutes rather than declaring them unconstitutional in toto. 1
Justice Kennedy has likewise been hostile toward abortion providers who have
tried to gain protection for their services in the face of virulent anti-abortion
protests. He hasjoined in opinions that have interpreted a variety of federal statutes
such as RICO, 7 1 the federal extortion statute, 72 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 in ways that
restrict abortion providers' legal recourse against protesters. 73 Furthermore, he has
voted only once, in the face of a First Amendment objection, in favor of a state
restriction on abortion protesters.74

64. Id. at 898 ("Women do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty when they marry. The
Constitution protects all individuals, male or female, married or unmarried, from the abuse of
governmental power, even where that power is employed for the supposed benefit of a member of the
individual's family.").
65. See id. at 937 38 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining that the twenty-four hour waiting
period and parental consent provisions are unconstitutional because they cause undue delay and burden
for women seeking an abortion).
66. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619, 1639 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,
956 57, 979 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
67. Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 297 (1997) (per curiam); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417, 480-81 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in thejudgment in part and dissenting in part); Ohio
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510 (1990).
68. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 969, 974 75 (1997) (per curiam).
69. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 519 20 (1989).
70. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 323, 332 (2006); Leavitt v. Jane
L., 518 U.S. 137, 143-44, 146 (1996) (per curiam); Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Servs., 516
U.S. 474, 477 (1996) (per curiam).
71. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 1968 (2000).
72. Id. § 1951.
73. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9, 12, 16 (2006) (extortion); Scheidler v.
Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 395, 411 (2003) (RICO); Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 264 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (RICO); Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Ctr., 506 U.S. 263, 287-88 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (Section 1985).
74. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 475, 488 (1988) (voting to uphold the constitutionality of a
private residence picketing restriction challenged by an abortion protester). For cases in which Kennedy
voted against such restrictions, see Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,792 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 385, 395 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 784 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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Although appointed by a President who seemed intent on appointing Justices
to overturn Roe v. Wade, Justice Kennedy's views on abortion were unknown at the
time he joined the Court." In Casey he proved that he would not go so far as
overturning Roe. But he also was part of an opinion that, as he emphasized almost
a decade later in dissenting from the Court's approval of a bubble zone of
protection around women entering abortion clinics, described abortion as "an act
fraught with consequences for others," including "the woman who must live with
the implications of her decision" to take advantage of a procedure that "some deem
nothing short of an act of violence against innocent human life."76 Although his
seemingly profound moral difficulty with the act of abortion has not yet led him to
overturn Roe, it has led him to approve almost every abortion restriction that the
Court has considered.
C. Title IX
Justice Kennedy hasjoined in only one opinion in a Title IX case that has ruled
in favor of a sex discrimination claim. In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools,77 he joined a unanimous Court that found that successful Title IX
claimants could be awarded damages, not merely injunctive relief.8 However, in
the other Title IX cases that have come before the Court, he has voted against a
broad interpretation of Title IX. Justice Kennedy's Title IX jurisprudence creates
high barriers for those who wish to sue schools for sexual harassment by teachers;79
prohibits students from suing schools for sexual harassment by other students;80
rejects claims for retaliation if a school takes adverse action against a
"whistleblower"; 8 1and excludes from Title IX coverage umbrella organizations that
receive payments from federally funded schools.82
In only one of these cases did Justice Kennedy write his own opinion. His
dissent in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education reveals Justice Kennedy's
views regarding sex discrimination claims in the educational setting. Invoking the
First Amendment and federal statutes that protect particular classes of students in
schools, Justice Kennedy displays in his dissent an underlying fear that the
educational mission of schools would be impeded if the Court allowed unrestricted
liability for sexual harassment claims. 3 This position is consistent with his other

75. See Stuart Taylor Jr., Judge Kennedy: TiltingRight butNot Far,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1987,
at AI, A30.
76. Hill, 530 U.S. at 791 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
78. Id. at 62, 76.
79. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 276, 277 (1998) (prohibiting
recovery of damages unless a school official with the "authority to institute corrective measures" on
behalf of the school district has "actual notice" of the behavior and displays deliberate indifference).
80. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 656-58 (1999) (Kennedy, J.
dissenting).
81. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 184 85, 195 96 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
82. See NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 461-62 (1999).
83. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 664-68 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing various provisions of the
Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 1482 (1994)).
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nonunanimous Title IX votes. When faced with the competing concerns of those
suffering sex discrimination84 and schools trying to teach students without facing
federal liability,"5 Justice Kennedy has sided with the schools.
D. Title VII
In stark contrast to the small number of Title IX cases, Justice Kennedy has
participated in twenty-four Title VII sex discrimination cases while on the Court.
Half have been unanimous opinions, and in all but one of those unanimous
opinions, the Court found for the sex discrimination claimant.8 6 The unanimous
8' 7
cases run the gamut from procedural issues such as the definition of "employer,
the availability of front pay as a remedy,"8 and the scope and nature of federal court
jurisdiction over Title VII cases89-- to weightier substantive issues-such as
whether the statute covers same-sex harassment, 9° whether it protects against fetal
protection policies, 9 and what degree of hostility in the work environment
constitutes sexual harassment. 92 During Justice Kennedy's tenure on the Court, the
only case in which a unanimous Court ruled against a Title VII sex discrimination
rights claim is Clark County School Districtv. Breeden,93 in which the Court ruled
that a single incident of harassment was not enough to constitute discrimination
under Title VII. 94
More interesting than Justice Kennedy's votes in these unanimous opinions are
his votes in the twelve nonunanimous Title VII cases. In those cases, he voted
against the sex discrimination claimant nine times and in favor of the claimant only
three. The three cases in which he voted for the sex discrimination claimant all
involved the expansion of substantive liability under Title VII. In the companion
cases of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth95 and Faragherv. City of Boca
Raton,96 he wrote for the majority in the former and sided with the majority in the
latter. Both holdings expanded Title VIi's vicarious liability rules for employers to
include liability when a supervisor sexually harasses another employee.97 Several
years later, he also sided with the majority in deciding that a constructive discharge
could constitute an adverse employment action.9" All three of these cases expanded
the conduct for which employers could be held liable under Title VII.

84. Gebser, 524 U.S. at284 ("We have a measure of latitude to shape a sensible remedial
scheme.").
85. Cf id.at 289 90 (expressing concern about the financial implications of holding schools
vicariously liable).
86. See infra app. A.
87. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503 (2006); Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519
U.S. 202, 204 (1997).
88. Pollard v. E.. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846 (2001).
89. Yellow Freight Sys. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 821 (1990).
90. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 76 (1998).
91. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 190 (1991).
92. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993).
93. 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam).
94. Id.at 271.

95. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
96. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
97. Faragher,524 U.S. at779-80; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at746, 765-66.
98. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 132, 143 (2004).
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In the other nine cases, Justice Kennedy sided with the employer in finding
procedural barriers to the sex discrimination claim. These procedural issues
included the retroactive application of precedent,99 awards of attorney fees'00 and
punitive damages,' 0 ' the method of taxing Title VII awards,'0 2 and the authority of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to award damages against the
federal government.0 3 Most recently, Justice Kennedy sided with four other
Justices in denying a Title VII pay discrimination claim based on a cramped reading
of the statute of limitations."14 The Court ruled that a pay discrimination claimant
must bring her action when the first act of pay discrimination occurs; each
subsequent paycheck reflecting a differential in pay does not restart the statute of
limitations.' This decision has been roundly criticized as a severe restriction on
pay discrimination lawsuits because the information contributing to pay decisions
is often kept secret by employers. 106 However, it is consistent with Justice
Kennedy's overall reluctance to open procedural avenues to Title VII sex
discrimination claimants.
Trying to discern a principle from these varied cases is difficult. In the "easy"
cases (those in which the Court did not split), Justice Kennedy, like the rest of the
members of the Court, has been a reliable vote in favor of sex discrimination
claimants. However, in the more difficult split cases, Justice Kennedy has shown
a difference between substantive and procedural issues. He has been willing to
expand Title VII substantively to allow for more claims that promote sex equality,
but he has been consistently resistant to any procedural expansion of Title VII.
E. Gay Rights
Justice Kennedy's greatest contributions in furthering sex and gender equality
have come in the area of gay rights. Romer v. Evans 0 and Lawrence v. Texas' 8 are
landmark decisions in this area, and Justice Kennedy wrote both opinions.' 0 9 His
opinion in Romer interpreted equal protection principles to protect gay men and
lesbians from government action based on animus."' Likewise, his opinion in

99. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994); Florida v. Long, 487 U.S. 223,
225-26 (1988).
100. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 754, 766 (1989).
101. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n,527 U.S. 526, 528, 546 (1999).
102. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 230, 242 (1992).
103. West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 213, 224 (1999).
104. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2165 (2007).
105. Id.at 2167 72.
106. See, e.g., Scott A. Moss,Fighting Discrimination While Fighting Litigation: A Tale of Two
Supreme Courts, 76 FORDHAML. REv. 981, 987, 990 95 (2007)(describing the "harshness" of the rule
from Ledbetter); Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword. Constitutions and Capabilities: "Perception"
Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 80 (2007) (criticizing the majority's formalistic
reasoning that ignored evidence that employers often keep pay decisions secret, thus making such
decisions difficult for potential pay discrimination plaintiffs to discover).
107. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
108. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
109. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at561; Romer,517 U.S. at621.
110. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 ("[Amendment 2's] sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the
reasons offered for itthat the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class
it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.").
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Lawrence speaks eloquently to the importance of self-definition free from
government imposed views relating to the morality of sexual orientation or forms
of sexual activity."'
However, much has been written about the doctrinal limitations of both
decisions," 2 and the effects of those doctrinal limitations continue today. For
instance, the Eleventh Circuit relied on both Romer's and Lawrence's limited
holdings in upholding Florida's sweeping prohibition on gay adoption.' Because
Justice Kennedy did not grant sexual orientation protected status in Romer, the
Eleventh Circuit did not apply heightened scrutiny and therefore found that
Florida's prohibition did not run afoul of equal protection concerns." 4 The court
found that the legislature was motivated by something other than mere animus,
namely, concern for children."' Similarly, because Justice Kennedy did not find
any fundamental right to be at issue in Lawrence, Florida's prohibition did not raise
a substantive due process issue.' If either case had given more explicit doctrinal
protection to gay rights claims, the Eleventh Circuit would have likely reached a
different result.' 17
Justice Kennedy's other decisions relating to gay rights have not been
protective of these rights. As discussed in the next sub-Section, he twice found
unconstitutional state public accommodations requirements that allowed gay men
and lesbians to take part in important aspects of civic life.' Furthermore, he twice
voted with a unanimous Court to give deference to the military when confronted
with a challenge based on sexual orientation."'

111. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at567 ("When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with
another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.").
112. See, e.g.,
Katherine M. Franke, The DomesticatedLiberty ofLawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1399, 1411 (2004) (discussing the "limited utility of Lawrence"); Kate Girard, Note, The
IrrationalLegacy ofRomer v. Evans: A Decade of JudicialReview Reveals the Needfor Heightened
Scrutiny of Legislation that Denies Equal Protectionto Members of the Gay Community, 36 N.M. L.
REV. 565, 565 66 (2006) (detailing Romer's limits and concluding that "a decade of lower court
precedent cites
Romer for the rule that law that classifies on the basis of sexual orientation is presumed
valid so long as the statute is rationally related to any legitimate state interest"); Brian Hawkins, Note,
The Glucksberg Renaissance:Substantive Due ProcessSince Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REV.
409, 412 (2007) (providing an empirical study concluding that Lawrence has had a limited effect in the
lower courts because of, among other things, its "lack of guidance").
113. Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815 17, 826 27
(1 th Cir. 2004).
114. Id.at818 (finding that Romer required only rational basis review).
115. Id.at 818-20.
116. Id. at 817 (finding that Lawrence did not require heightened substantive due process
analysis).
117. As this Article was in the last stages of editing, the Ninth Circuit decided Witt v. Dep't of
Air Force, No. 06-35644, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10794 (9th Cir. May 21, 2008). In Witt, the majority
decision interpreted Lawrence as applying intermediate scrutiny and remanded the case to apply that
standard to the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy for gay men and lesbians. See id.at *29 30,
38. The concurring and dissenting opinion in the case read Lawrence as requiring strict scrutiny. Id.at
*55-56. Justice Kennedy's opaque language in Lawrence led directly to the differences among the
Ninth and Eleventh Circuit judges.
118. Boy Scouts ofAm. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 642, 661 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 559, 581 (1995).
119. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 50, 68-70 (2006); see
also Carlucci v. Doe, 488 U.S. 93, 94, 103 04 (1988).
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F. FirstAmendment Free Speech
Justice Kennedy has been hailed as a First Amendment libertarian. 2 '
According to one study, during the period from 1994 to 2002, he was the most profree speech Justice among all the members of the Court. 2 ' This tendency is
apparent in some of Justice Kennedy's free speech rulings in sex discrimination
cases but not all.
Free speech issues arise in the context of sex discrimination cases in a variety
of contexts. Usually, the First Amendment arises as a defense when the government
tries to impose a requirement that furthers sex equality but also restricts speech. The
Supreme Court has decided seven such cases while Justice Kennedy has been on
the Court: three in the abortion protester context, 22 three in the public
accommodations context,"' and one inthe Title VII context. 124 Two other First
Amendment cases decided during Kennedy's time on the Court involved claims
that the First Amendment right to express
an anti-sex equality position was being
2
restricted by government regulation. 1
Justice Kennedy's views on these complex cases are difficult to categorize. In
the first three cases, all decided within Justice Kennedy's first two years on the
Court, he sided with the government. In a unanimous opinion, he agreed with the
rest of the Court that New York's public accommodations law forbidding
"discrimination by certain private clubs"' 126 was not facially invalid under the First
Amendment, although he did join in a concurring opinion written by Justice
O'Connor indicating that the law might be unconstitutional as applied to some
private organizations. 27 He also joined in another unanimous decision finding that
the First Amendment does not give private universities blanket protection from the2
discovery of results of internal investigations into sex discrimination allegations. 1
In both of these cases, Justice Kennedy refused to read the First Amendment so
broadly as to encompass new protections, although both left open possibilities of
some First Amendment application in the area of sex discrimination. In the other
case decided in Justice Kennedy's first two years, which also happened to be his
first abortion-related case, he sided with the majority finding that a local ordinance
forbidding picketing an individual's residence was not unconstitutional
as applied
12 9
to anti-abortion protesters picketing an abortion doctor's house.

120. See Helen J. Knowles, The Supreme Court as Civic Educator: Free Speech According to
Justice Kennedy, 6 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 252, 252 (2008).
121. See Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994 2002,
http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/howvoted.htm (last
visited Apr. 5, 2008) (providing an update of
Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994 2000, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1191
(2001)).
122. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707 (2000); Madsen v. Women's Health Cir., Inc., 512 U.S.
753, 757 (1994); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476 (1988).
123. Boy Scouts ojAm., 530 U.S. at 644; Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559; N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City
of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 4 (1988).
124. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 184-85 (1990).
125. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 51 (2006); Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177 78 (1991).
126. N.Y.State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 4.
127. Id.at19-20 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
128. Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 201-02.
129. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476, 488 (1988).
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However, in each of the later six cases, Justice Kennedy consistently sided
against the position that would promote sex equality, regardless of the implications
on First Amendment issues. In two abortion protester cases, he dissented, arguing
that government regulation of protest violated the First Amendment. 30 Similarly,
in two cases in which Boston 3 ' and New Jersey' 32 tried to open public
accommodations to gay groups, Justice Kennedy sided with the majority, holding
that the First Amendment did not require private organizations to include the
participation of gay members or groups. 3 ' However, in two cases in which the
government action threatened anti-sex discrimination speech, he sided with the
government. In the first case, he agreed with a 5 to 4 majority that federal
regulations can prohibit clinics that receive federal funds from engaging in abortion
counseling.' 34 In the other case, he was part of the unanimous decision that found
that universities do not have a First Amendment right to prohibit military recruiters
from their campus because they disapproved of the military's policy on sexual
orientation. "'
These cases are certainly few in number, especially when broken down
chronologically: three were decided in the first two years, while six cases were
decided in the next eighteen years. To the extent a pattern has emerged in the six
cases decided after Justice Kennedy's initial years on the Court, however, it appears
that he adjusts his First Amendment jurisprudence to vote against a claim of sex
discrimination. Sometimes his First Amendment views protect speech, and other
times they do not; in all circumstances, however, the sex discrimination claim loses.
IV.

GENDER ACCORDING TO JUSTICE KENNEDY

Justice Kennedy's voting pattern in sex discrimination cases should cause
concern for advocates of sex equality. The doctrinal trends and patterns that emerge
from looking at the individual cases as categorized above are also troubling.
However, even more concerning for the future are the general notions of gender that
lurk behind Justice Kennedy's j urisprudence. Throughout his substantive opinions
and votes relating to sex discrimination is the theme that, in cases addressing the
parent-child relationship, Justice Kennedy adheres to a very traditional and
paternalistic notion of gender roles.
As discussed above, Justice Kennedy has voted to uphold claims of sex
discrimination in some high profile cases and voted against such claims in many
other cases. Reconciling these cases, especially in the context of equal protection
and due process, requires a closer look at notions of gender as reflected in the
parent child relationship.
In cases not involving the parent child relationship, Justice Kennedy has
diverged from patriarchal and traditional notions of gender. In his first sex

130. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 765 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Madsen v. Women's
Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 785-86 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
131. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
132. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
133. Boy Scouts ofAn., 530 U.S. at 642, 644; Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559.
134. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 176-78 (1991).
135. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 70 (2006).
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discrimination equal protection case, JE.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.,' 36 Justice
Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence emphasizing that an individual denied jury
service because of a peremptory challenge based on sex suffers an injury "to
personal dignity and to the individual's right to participate in the political
process."' 37 This explanation of the reasons for applying equal protection principles
38
to such sex-based actions implicitly rejected the reasoning of Hoyt v. Florida,'
the
Supreme Court case that upheld a state restriction on women's eligibility for jury
service.' 39 The Court in that case specifically relied on gender stereotypes in finding
that the restriction was justified because a "woman is still regarded as the center of
home and family life."' 4 Justice Kennedy's concurrence inJ.E.B. did not mention
Hoyt, although the majority that he did not join mentioned the case;' 4' nonetheless,
he rejected application of stereotypes about gender roles to limit women's civic
participation.
In United States v. Virginia,'42 Justice Kennedy joined in Justice Ginsburg's
majority opinion that expressly rejected the idea of basing state action on gender
stereotypes. 143 In this case, Virginia argued that women were not capable of
participating in the military institute's rigorous training without changing essential
characteristics of the program;'44 however, the Court refused to accept such
generalizations about women's nature and physical capabilities. 45 Justice Ginsburg
wrote the following: "[G]eneralizations about 'the way women are,' estimates of
what is appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to
46
women whose talent and capacity place them outside the average description.''
Like his vote in JE.B., Justice Kennedy's vote in Virginia demonstrates his belief
that gender stereotypes that do not address the parent-child relationship cannot be
the basis for state action and differentiation based on sex.
The same can be said of his opinions in Romer and Lawrence. Both opinions
protect against gender stereotyping in civic life, albeit, like JE.B. and Virginia,
outside the context of the parent-child relationship. At issue in Romer was a state
constitutional amendment that prohibited any government action aimed at
protecting homosexuals from discrimination. Colorado attempted to justify the
amendment based on the public's moral disapproval of men and women who step
outside their traditional gender roles and form intimate relationships with someone
of the same sex. 1 47 Justice Scalia stated in his dissent that such moral condemnation

136. 511 U.S. 127(1994).
137. Id. at 153 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
138. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
139. Id.at69.
140. Id. at 62.
141. Id. at 131 n.3, 134.
142. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
143. Id.at 519-20.
144. Id. at 520 23, 540.
145. Id.at 545-46. For a more complete discussion of the Court's rejection of stereotypes in
United States v. Virginia, see David S. Cohen, No Boy Left Behind? Single-Sex Education and the
Essentialist Myth of Masculinity, 84 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at64 & nn.279-82),
available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract= 1083816.
146. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550.
147. Brief for Petitioners at40, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), 1995 WE
310026 (citing "the contours of social and moral norms" as providing a rational basis for Amendment
2); id. at 46 ("The implicit endorsement ofhomosexuality fostered by laws granting special protections
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is an appropriate basis for state classifications.' 48 However, in his majority opinion,
Justice Kennedy called such moral condemnation "animus"' 9 and concluded that
such animus cannot form the basis for prohibiting gays and lesbians from seeking
government protection. 150Likewise, in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy found that moral
beliefs about gendered notions of proper sexual partners and activities cannot form
the basis for laws that deny certain liberties under the Due Process Clause.' 51 Thus,
in both Romer and Lawrence, Justice Kennedy refused to accept rigid gender roles
as the basis for civic condemnation.
From these four cases, it appears that Justice Kennedy disapproves of gender
stereotyping; 52 however, he takes the opposite view when cases present issues
involving gendered notions of the parent child relationship. In sex discrimination
cases involving the parent-child relationship, Justice Kennedy relies on traditional
and paternalistic gender stereotypes about nontraditional fathers, 53 idealized
mothers, and second-guessing women's decisions.
Cases involving the father child relationship most directly illustrate Justice
Kennedy's preoccupation with traditional parenting gender roles. In both Miller v.
54
Albright1
and Nguyen v. INS.,' 5 5 Justice Kennedy voted to uphold a federal
statute imposing stricter requirements for proof of citizenship on children of unwed
parents whose father is a United States citizen than on children whose mother is a
United States citizen." 6 Because Justice Kennedy's vote in Miller was based on
third-party standing principles, 157 his opinion on the merits for the majority in
Nguyen is most instructive. In that opinion, Justice Kennedy specifically stated that
he would not rely on stereotypes but rather biological fact: the mother must be
present at birth while the same is not necessarily true for the father.' 8 He noted that
for mothers, birth is a time at which there is an opportunity "to develop a real,
meaningful relationship" with the child, while fathers will not necessarily even
"know that a child was conceived" and their identity will not always be known to
"even the mother.' 59

could undermine the efforts of some parents to teach traditional moral values.").
148. Romer, 517 U.S. at644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 632 (majority opinion).
150. Id. at 635 36.
151. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2 003).
152. Despite this broad condemnation of sex stereotyping from Justice Kennedy, he did not join
the majority in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins that found that Title VII prohibits employers from relying
on stereotypes. See 490 U.S. 228, 294 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("I think it important to stress
that Title VII creates no independent cause of action for sex stereotyping."). Nor did his condemnation
of sex stereotyping bring him to conclude that Congress could fight sex stereotyping by enacting the
Family and Medical Leave Act and applying it to the states. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs,
538 U.S. 721, 748 49 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (implicitly rejecting sex stereotyping but
concluding that there was a lack of evidence of such stereotyping supporting the outcome).
153. By "nontraditional fathers," the author refers to those fathers who fall outside the norm of
the married father whose wife cares for the children.
154. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
155. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
156. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73: Miller, 523 U.S. at 445-46 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
157. Miller, 523 U.S. at 445 46 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
158. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at68, 73. Justice Kennedy referred to this fact as one of the "most basic
biological differences" between men and women. Id.at73.
159. Id. at 65.
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Despite Justice Kennedy's statement to the contrary in Nguyen, he did rely on
gender stereotypes of women and men and their relationship to their children in
Nguyen. Justice O'Connor's dissent rightly decries the majority's use of
stereotypes, including overbroad generalizations that birth guarantees a meaningful
relationship between mother and child, that fathers present at birth cannot form
such a relationship themselves, that mothers should care for their children but
fathers can ignore them, and that men are irresponsible fathers. 60 Justice Kennedy,
who in other contexts has advocated against the use of gender-based stereotypes, 161
relied heavily on them in Nguyen. What separates Nguyen from the other cases is
its context: the parent child relationship. Nguyen exemplifies two themes that are
central to Justice Kennedy's conception of gender: his scorn for nontraditional
fatherhood and his idealization of motherhood.
Justice Kennedy's disdain for nontraditional fatherhood appears in other cases.
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., a substantive due process case, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of California's statutory presumption that a child born to a married
couple is the husband's child despite evidence that another man is the child's
biological father.'62 Again, Justice Kennedy's vote with the majority"' reinforces
the idealized notion of parenthood that he specifically praised in Nguyen. The idea
behind the Court's holding in Michael H. presumes that married couples have an
ideal relationship with each other and with "their" children, whereas unmarried
fathers can be lawfully cast aside. Justice Kennedy's dissent in Nevada Department
of Human Resources v. Hibbs walks a similar line by approving more generous
parenting leave policies for women than for men.164 According to Justice Kennedy,
men who step outside the traditional role of fathers and take time off from work to
care for their children can be treated differently by the state. Not only do these
opinions ignore the reality of changed family relationships where fathers play a
significant parenting role, 16 they also further the stereotype that fathers are not as
involved with their children.' 66
Justice Kennedy's idealization of motherhood is also apparent in cases
involving pregnancy and abortion. In UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.'6 7 and
Ferguson v. City of Charleston,'68 he voted against fetal protection policies but
wrote orjoined in separate opinions emphasizing the need to protect the fetus from

160. Id. at 86 87, 92, 94 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v.
Geduldig: Regulating Women's Sexuality, 56 EMORY L.J. 1235, 1296 (2007) (noting Nguyen's
promotion of "the stereotype that men, but not women, should be legally entitled to abdicate
responsibility for their nonmarital children").
161. See supra text accompanying notes 136 51.
162. 491 U.S. 110, 113, 131-32(1989).
163. Justice Kennedy joined all but footnote six of Justice Scalia's majority opinion. Id. at 113.
That footnote specified a particular form of substantive due process analysis that Justice Kennedy
believed could be too constraining for future cases. See id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
164. See 538 U.S. 721, 751 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (calling the majority's view a"cramped
vision of 'the family' and not in keeping with the times).
166. Naomi R. Calm, Refraining Child Custody Decisionmaking,58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 37 n. 142
(1997).
167. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
168. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
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the woman who puts herself in a potentially harmful position. 6 9 In Johnson
Controls,hejoined Justice White's concurring opinion that refused to categorically
declare that all gender-specific fetal protection policies violated Title VII. 0 In
Ferguson, he wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, emphasizing
that a pregnant woman who ingests cocaine risks harming her fetus and that a state
can punish a woman who uses drugs during her pregnancy.' 7' According to Justice
Kennedy, such a woman "has so little regard for her own unborn that she risks
causing him or her lifelong damage and suffering."'7

2

In both cases, Justice

Kennedy indicates that an ideal mother would not place her fetus in harm's
way even for employment purposes or because of addiction and within certain
bounds, employers and the state can punish women who step outside this idealized
notion of motherhood.
Justice Kennedy's abortion jurisprudence shows similar reliance on the
74
idealized mother. 173 In Gonzales v. Carhart,1
the most recent abortion case heard
by the Court, Justice Kennedy justified the restriction on abortion methods by
stating that "[r]espect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of
love the mother has for her child."' 75 He emphasized his idealization of women's
relationship to their children by relying heavily on stories of women who secondguessed their decisions to abort, or, in other words, women who realize that such
action fails to live up to the ideal of motherhood.' 7 6 Justice Ginsburg's dissent
decries this reliance on "ancient notions about women's place in the family and
under the Constitution."' 7 7 But Justice Kennedy's reliance on these notions about
a woman's proper place, particularly with respect to motherhood, is consistent with
his other cases that rely on idealized motherhood, even if it not consistent with the
Court's general reluctance to engage in sex stereotyping.
The particular abortion restrictions Justice Kennedy has voted to uphold further
demonstrate his reliance on the stereotype of idealized motherhood. According to
Justice Kennedy, state laws requiring more information be given to a woman
179
considering abortion,' awaiting period for a woman to reconsider her decision,
and testing to ensure that a viable fetus is not being aborted 8 ' do not place an undue
burden on the rights of mothers. In Justice Kennedy's gendered world, a woman
needs this form of state protection because a true mother-an ideal mother-would
not kill her child. Only when the circumstances of a woman's life are so out of step

169. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 89 90 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Johnson Controls,
499 U.S. at 219 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
170. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 211 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
171. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 89 90 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
172. Id.
173. Mother is the word Justice Kennedy uses to describe a woman seeking an abortion even
though that woman is specifically seeking to avoid becoming a mother. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart,
127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (using the word mother throughout).
174. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
175. Id. at 1634.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
178. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pav. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885 (1992).
179. Id. at 887.
180. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 519 20 (1989).
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with idealized motherhood-when her husband is abusing her and threatening her
physical well-being is Justice Kennedy convinced that the ideal has to give way
to reality and that the state cannot intrude to force such married women to notify
their abusive husbands of their choice to abort.'' Only in such extreme situations
does the conception of idealized motherhood subside; otherwise, the state can force
its view of idealized motherhood on women.
Justice Kennedy's conception of the traditional parent child relationship not
only includes disapproval of nontraditional fatherhood and an idealized notion of
motherhood, but it also includes a paternalistic view of women's capacity to make
decisions, particularly young women. Justice Kennedy's paternalism is evident in
his views on the various forms of state involvement in restrictions on abortion,
including allowing the government to prohibit abortions based on the concern that
women will regret their decision,' 82 permitting the state to presume that women do
not fully consider the implications of having an abortion,' 83 and allowing the federal
government to seize medicine from women who wish to medically induce
abortion.' 84
The Court's decisions regarding the provision of information to women who
want or are considering an abortion most clearly reflect Justice Kennedy's
paternalism. As already discussed, Justice Kennedy's abortionjurisprudence allows
the state to require doctors to give women more information than doctors believe
is medically necessary before they perform the procedure. 8 ' With respect to his
opinions on restrictions on abortion protesters, Justice Kennedy believes the state
should allow opportunities for protesters to change women's minds because these
protesters may know better than women entering clinics." 6 On the other hand, the
state does not have to give women full information regarding abortion as a family
planning alternative; it can instead withhold that information from women because
it disapproves of their choice" 7 and even tell women who request information about
abortion that it is not an "appropriate method of family planning."'8 8 Thus,
according to Justice Kennedy, the state must allow people opposed to abortion to
communicate that view to women seeking an abortion but can restrict women's
access to information that might lead them to decide to have an abortion.' 89 Justice
Kennedy's views allow for state-supported manipulation of information designed
to change a woman's mind, the very essence of paternalism.

181. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 897 (plurality opinion).
182. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1634-35.
183. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885.
184. Benten v. Kessler, 505 U.S. 1084, 1084 85 (1992) (per curiam). Benten did not decide this
issue on the merits but the result permitted the government to confiscate a dose of RU-486.
185. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882-84.
186. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 789-91 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing the
"profound difference" protesters can have in a woman's decision to have an abortion).
187. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192 93 (1991).
188. Id.at180 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5) (1989)).
189. Justice Kennedy also voted to uphold the Adolescent Family Life Act, which restricted
federal funds for counseling related to premarital sexual activity and pregnancy to groups that did not
counsel about or provide abortions. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 596 97, 622 (1988). The Court
rejected an Establishment Clause challenge, id.at 618, and Justice Kennedy argued in a separate
concurring opinion that funds could flow to a pervasively sectarian organization as long as the funds
did not further religion. Id.at 624 25 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Similarly, according to Justice Kennedy, minors in particular are incapable of
making the decision to have an abortion and need the state's intervention. Justice
Kennedy has broadly approved of state laws requiring minors who want an abortion
to communicate with their parents, either to get their consent,9° or merely to notify
them beforehand.' 91 The basis of these rulings is Justice Kennedy's belief that
parents, who know better, 1can
counsel and make decisions for their minor
92
daughters, who know worse.
Thus, Justice Kennedy's gendered world is really only partially so. His high
profile cases reflect a world in which gender stereotyping has no place in civic life.
The state cannot rely on women's traditionally stereotyped role as homemakers to
exclude them from a jury or military school nor can it rely on moral denunciations
of same sex partners to exclude or punish gays and lesbians. However, a closer
analysis of his sex discrimination cases reveals that Justice Kennedy endorses the
oldest of stereotypes those regarding the parenting of nontraditional fathers,
women's role as mothers,, and the need for state-sanctioned protection of women.
These stereotypes control his reasoning in cases touching on the parent-child
relationship, and in these cases, Justice Kennedy's gendered world emerges.
V.

CONCLUSION

With Justice Kennedy as the new median Justice on the Court, those fighting
against sex discrimination must hope that he will join Justices Stevens, Souter,
Breyer, and Ginsburg in close cases. However, based on an analysis of his previous
cases, Justice Kennedy is far from a reliable vote for sex equality. Despite some
undeniably important rulings in favor of sex equality, in sex discrimination cases
that raise the parent child relationship, Justice Kennedy tends to vote based on his
traditional and paternalistic gendered view of the world.

190. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 899 (upholding a Pennsylvania parental consent statute).
191. See, e.g.,
Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292,297 (1997) (per curiam) (upholding a Montana
parental notification statute); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 517 (1990)
(upholding an Ohio parental notification statute); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417,496 97 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (upholding a Minnesota statute
that required two-parent notification).
192. See, e.g.,
Akron Ctr., 497 U.S. at520 ("It is both rational and fair for the State to conclude
that, in most instances, the family will strive to give a lonely or even terrified minor advice that is both
compassionate and mature."); Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 483 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) ("[A] [s]tate has an interest in seeing that a child, when confronted with
serious decisions such as whether or not to abort a pregnancy, has the assistance of her parents in
making the choice.").
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JUSTICE KENNEDY'S SEX DISCRIMINATION CASES
Outcome (pro Kennedy
sex equality, vote on
anti sex
outcome position
equality)

Case

Cite

Issue

New York State Club
Association v. City of
New York

487 U.S. 1 (1988)

First Amendment

pro

pro

majority
(9-0)

Florida v. Long

487 U.S. 223 (1988)

Title VII

anti

anti

majority
(5-4)

Frisby v. Schultz

487 U.S. 474 (1988)

Abortion/First
Amendment

pro

pro

majority
(6-3)

Bowen v. Kendrick

487 U.S. 589 (1988)

Sexual education

anti

anti

Carlucci v. Doe

488 U.S. 93 (1988)

Gay rights

anti

anti

majority
(5-4)
majority
(9-0)

Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins

490 U.S. 228 (1989)

Title VII

pro

anti

490 U.S. 900 (1989)

Title VII

anti

anti

majority
(5-3)

Michael H. v. Gerald D. 491 U.S. 110 (1989)

Substantive due
process/Fatherhood

anti

anti

majority
(5-4)

Independent Federation
of Flight Attendants v. 491 U.S. 754 (1989)
Zipes

Title VII

anti

anti

Abortion

anti

anti

majority
(5-4)

University of
493 U.S. 182 (1990)
Pennsylvania v. EEOC

Title VII/First
Amendment

pro

pro

majority
(9-0)

Yellow
System,
Y Freight
ell
y
494 U.S. 820 (1990)
Inc. v. Donnelly(90

Title VII

pro

pro

majority
(9-0)

Hodgson v. Minnesota 497 U.S. 417 (1990)

Abortion

pro

anti

dissent
(54)
(5-4)

Dhio v. Akron Center fo 4
Reproductive Health 497 U.S. 502 (1990

Abortion

anti

anti

Title VII

pro

pro

majority
(9-0)

Abortion/First
Amendment

anti

anti

majority
(5-4)

Franklin v. Gwinnett 503 U.S. 60 (1992)
County Public Schools

Title IX

pro

pro

majority
(9-0)

United States v. Burke 504 U.S. 229 (1992)

Title VII

anti

anti

m

Planned Parenthood of
505 U.S. 833 (1992)
Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey

Abortion

pro/anti

pro/anti

Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, Inc.

Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services

492

U.S. 490 (1989)

International Union v. 499 U.S. 187 (1991)
Johnson Controls
Rust v. Sullivan

500 U.S. 173 (1991)
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Benten v. Kessler

505 U.S. 1084
(1992)

Abortion

Bray v. Alexandria 506 U.S. 263 (1993)
Women's Health Clinic

Outcome (pro ennedy
sex equality, vote on Kennedy
anti sex
position
equality)
anti
anti
majority
(7-2)

Abortion

anti

anti

majority(6-3)

Title VII

pro

pro

majority
(9-0)

Abortion

anti

anti

Equal Protection

pro

pro

majority
(6-3)

Title VII

anti

anti.

majority
(8-1)
(8-1)

Abortion/First
Amendment

pro

anti

dissent
(6-3)

Gay rights/First
Amendment

anti

anti

m.majority
(9-0)

Abortion

anti

anti

pro

pro

majority
(6-3)

Abortion

anti

anti

United States v. Virginia 518 U.S. 515 (1996)

Equal Protection

pro

pro

majority
(5-4)
1jority
m
(7-1)

Walters v. Metropolitan
Educational Enterprises, 519 U.S. 202 (1997)
Inc.

Title VII

pro

pro

Schenck v. Pro-Choice
Network of Western 519 U.S. 357 (1997)
New York

Abortion

pro/anti

anti/anti

520 U.S. 292 (1997)

Abortion

anti

anti

dissent
(6-3),
majority
(8-i)
majority90

Mazurek v. Armstrong 520 U.S. 968 (1997)

Abortion

anti

anti

(6-3)

Title VII

pro

pro

majority(9-0)

Equal
Protection/Fatherhood

a
anti

anti

majority
(6-3)

Title IX

anti

anti

majority
(54)

Title VII

pro

pro

Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc.

510 U.S. 17 (1993)

National Organization
for Women, Inc. v. 510 U.S. 249 (1994)
Scheidler

.

J.E.B.v. Alabama ex rel. 511 U.S. 127 (1994)
T.B.
Landgrafv.
USI Film 511 U.S. 244 (1994)
rodct
Products
Madsen v. WomenIs
Health Center, Inc.

512 U.S. 753 (1994)

Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual 515 U.S. 557 (1995)
Group of Boston
Dalton v. Little Rock
Family Planning
516 U.S. 474 (1996)
Services

.

Romer v. Evans

517 U.S. 620 (1996) Equal Protection/Gay
rights

Leavitt v. Jane L.

518 U.S. 137 (1996)

Lambert v. Wicklund

Oncale
Offhev. Sundowner
Services
523 U.S. 75 (1998)
Offshore Services(90
Miller v. Albright
523 U.S. 420 (1998)
Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School 524 U.S. 274 (1998)
District
Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)
Inc. v. Ellerth
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Cite

Case

Issue

Outcome (pro ennedy
sex equality, vote on Kennedy
anti sex
eult) outcome Position
eFCuality)

Faragher v. City ofBoca 524 U.S. 775 (1998)
Raton

Title VII

pro

pro

525 U.S. 459 (1999)

Title IX

anti

anti

Davis v. Monroe County
Board ofEducation 526 U.S. 629 (1999)

Title IX

pro

anti

dissent
(5-4)

527 U.S. 212 (1999)

Title VII

pro

anti

dissent
sse4)
(5-4)

anti

anti.

majority(5-4)

anti

anti

majority
(54)

a
anti

anti

majority
(5-4)

anti

dissent
(6-3)

pro

anti

dissent
(5-4)

Fourth
mendment/Pregnancy

pro

pro

majority
(6-3)

Clark
County
ClariCty
. eSchool 532 U.S. 268 (2001)
District v. Breeden(90

Title VII

anti

anti.

majority
(9-0)

Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de 5 3 2 U.S. 843 (2001)
Nemours & Co.

Title VII

pro

pro

majority
(8-0)

Equal
Protection/Fatherhood

anti

anti

majority
(5-4)

Title VII

pro

pro

majority
(9-0)

Abortion

anti

anti

majority
(81)

Nevada Department of
Human Resources v. 538 U.S. 721 (2003)
Hibbs

Equal
Protection/Section 5

pro

anti

dissent
(6-3)

Desert Palace v. Costa 539 U.S. 90 (2003)

Title VII

pro

pro

NCAA v. Smith

West v. Gibson

Kolstad
American 527 U.S. 526 (1999)
Dental v.Asocan
Title VII
Dental Association(54
UntdSae
.Equal
United States v.
529 U.S. 598 (2000) Protection/Section 5
PrtcinScin5(5-4)
Morrison
Boy Scouts of America 530 U.S. 640 (2000)
v. Dale
Hill v. Colorado

530 U.S. 703 (2000)

Stenberg v. Carhart

530 U.S. 914 (2000)

Ferguson v. City of
Charleston

532 U.S. 67(2001)

Nguyen v.I.N.S.

533 U.S. 53 (2001)

Edelman v. Lynchburg
College
535 U.S. 106 (2002)
Scheidler v. National
Organization for
Women, Inc.

537 U.S. 393 (2003)

Gay rights/First
Amendment

.

Abortion/First
pro
Amendment
Amendments(6n3
Abortion

majority
(7-2)
* majority(90)

majority
(9-0)
majority
(6-3)

Lawrence v. Texas

539 U.S. 558 (2003)

Gay rights

pro

pro

Pennsylvania State
Police v. Suders

542 U.S. 129 (2004)

Title VII

pro

pro

Title IX

pro

anti

dissent
(5-4)

Abortion

anti

anti

majority
(90)

Jackson v. Birmingham
Board of Education 544 U.S. 167 (2005
Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of Northern 546 U.S. 320 (2006)
New England
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Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. 546 U.S. 500 (2006)
Scheidler v. National
Organization for
Women, Inc.

547 U.S. 9 (2006)

Rumsfeld v. Forum for

Academic &
Institutional Rights

Title VII

Abortion
G

547 U.S. 47 (2006)

Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. 548 U.S. 53 (2006)
White

Outcome (pro ennedy
sex equality, vote on Kennedy
anti sex
Position
equality)
pro
pro
mjority
(8-0)
majority
anti
anti
(80)
mcority
i ority

r

Amendmentstnt

Title VII

pro

pro

majority
(9-0)

Gonzales v. Carhart

1270Ct. 1610
(2007)

Abortion

anti

anti

majority
(5-4)

Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co.

127 S. Ct. 2162
(2007)

Title VII

anti

anti

majority
(5-4)
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Nonunanimous Cases

Cite

Kennedy vote on outcome

Florida v. Long

487 U.S. 223 (1988)

anti

O'Connor

ote
vote
anti

Frisby v. Schultz

487 U.S. 474 (1988)

pro

pro

Bowen v. Kendrick

487 U.S. 589 (1988)

anti

anti

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins

490 U.S. 228 (1989)

anti

pro

Michael H. v. Gerald D.

491 U.S. 110 (1989)

anti

anti

Independent Federation of Flight Attendantsv 491 U.S. 754(1989)
Zipes

anti

Webster v. Reproductive Health Services

492 U.S. 490 (1989)

anti

anti

Hodgson v. Minnesota

497 U.S. 417 (1990)

anti

pro

Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health 497 U.S. 502 (1990)

anti

anti

Rust v. Sullivan

500 U.S. 173 (1991)

anti

pro

United States v. Burke

504 U.S. 229 (1992)

anti

pro

Benten v. Kessler

505 U.S. 1084 (1992)

anti

anti

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey

505 U.S. 833 (1992)

pro/anti

pro/anti

Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Center

506 U.S. 263 (1993)

anti

pro

J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B.

511 U.S. 127 (1994)

pro

pro

Landgraf v. USI Film Products

511 U.S. 244 (1994)

anti

anti

Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.

512 U.S. 753 (1994)

anti

pro

Romer v. Evans

517 U.S. 620 (1996)

pro

pro

Leavitt v. Jane L.

518 U.S. 137(1996)

anti

anti

United States v. Virginia

518 U.S. 515 (1996)

pro

pro

anti/anti

pro/anti

Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western
Ne ok519
New York

U.S. 357 (1997)

Mazurek v. Armstrong

520 U.S. 968 (1997)

anti

anti

Miller v. Albright

523 U.S. 420 (1998)

anti

anti

Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District

524 US 274 (1998)

anti

anti

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth

524 U.S. 742 (1998)

pro

pro

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton

524 U.S. 775 (1998)

pro

pro

Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education

526 U.S. 629 (1999)

anti

pro

West v. Gibson

527 U.S. 212 (1999)

anti

pro

Kolstad v. American Dental Association

527 U.S. 526 (1999)

anti

anti

United States v. Morrison

529 U.S. 598 (2000)

anti

anti

Boy Scouts of America v. Dale

530 U.S. 640 (2000)

anti

anti

Hill v. Colorado

530 U.S. 703 (2000)

anti

pro

Stenberg v. Carhart

530 U.S. 914 (2000)

anti

pro

Ferguson v. City of Charleston

532 U.S. 67 (2001)

pro

pro
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Nonunanimous Cases

Cite

Kennedy vote on outcome

Nguyen v. I.N.S.

533 U.S. 53 (2001)

anti

O'Connor
ote

vote

Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, 537 U.S. 393 (2003)
Inc.

pro

anti

Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs

538 U.S. 721 (2003)

anti

pro

Lawrence v. Texas

539 U.S. 558 (2003)

pro

pro

Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders

542 U.S. 129 (2004)

pro

pro

Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education

544 U.S. 167 (2005)

anti

pro
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